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Voices of Occupiers/Liberators:
The BBC’s Radio Propaganda in
Italy between 1942 and 1945
Ester Lo Biundo
University of Reading, Berkshire, UK
The ambiguity of the role played by British propaganda in Italy during the
Second World War is clearly reflected in the phenomenon of Radio London.
While Radio London raised the morale of the Italian civilians living under
the Fascist regime and provided them with alternative information on the con-
flict, the microphones of the BBC were also used by the British government to
address a country they were planning to occupy. In this article, I will analyse the
occupation/liberation operations that were run at the BBC Italian Service from
two separate angles. On the one hand, the analysis of the programmes broad-
cast between the months preceding the Allies’ landing in Sicily and the actual
occupation shows how the Allies built their image as liberators and guarantors
of better living conditions. On the other, the analysis of the relationships
between the Foreign Office and the anti-Fascist exiles reveals that the Italian
BBC broadcasters were not always allowed to freely express their political
opinion or to dispose of their own lives.
keywords The Second World War, BBC Italian Service, Radio London, Allied
occupation/liberation of Italy, Civilians’ living conditions, Italian anti-Fascist
exiles, Italian internees, British Foreign Office
In September 1938, the Munich agreement between France, Germany, Italy, and UK
revealed the failure of the appeasement policy adopted by Neville Chamberlain
towards Germany. The Second World War would break out the following year. In
the same month, Churchill’s speech on the Munich crisis was translated and broad-
cast by the BBC in France, Germany and Italy (Briggs, 1970; Limentani, 1973;
Piccialuti Caprioli, 1976). This first broadcast to Italy would be followed by
regular news bulletins in Italian. However, ‘Radio Londra’ would only be properly
established in 1940, when an Italian entrance into the war was likely to happen
(Piccialuti Caprioli, 1976: xiv).
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The gradual increase in numbers of staff and of programmes broadcast daily indi-
cates that the BBC European Service as a whole, as well as the Italian branch,
became more specialized year by year (BBC, 1945: 3–4; Piccialuti Caprioli, 1976:
xiv–xv). A number of Italian anti-Fascists emigrated to the UK began working for
the Italian Service. Among them Paolo and Treves, sons of the socialist Claudio
Treves, the literary critic Limentani, the university professor Calosso, the lawyer
and journalist Elio Nissim, the historian Arnaldo Momigliano, and Ruggero
Orlando. After the war Orlando would become a famous correspondent from
New York for RAI, the Italian national television.
Informative materials for soldiers on Italian politics, economy, and society such as
the Sicily Zone Handbook, as well as directives on how to behave towards Italian
civilians (Mangiameli, 1994; Williams, 2013), demonstrate that the Allies’ landing
in Italy was more than a simple military operation. In order to be successful, the
Anglo-Americans needed to know the country they were occupying. As for propa-
ganda, the ‘psychological war’ waged by the Allies in Italy (Mercuri, 1983),
needed to rely on a solid and in-depth knowledge of the Italians. To make the
most of radio broadcasts, it was therefore crucial to mobilize the cultural arguments
that would find a soft spot in the vast and varied Italian population. In this context,
the knowledge and experience of the Italian exiles was extremely valuable.
Making quantitative estimations on the Italian Service audience size was not easy
for several reasons. Fascist Italy forbade foreign radios: heavy fines, arrests, or con-
finement would be used against those who contravened regulations (Piccialuti
Caprioli, 1976: lxi–lxxx). Only a few Italians could afford to purchase a radio trans-
mitter and gatherings of people secretly listening to Radio London were very
common. The number of wireless owners therefore did not reflect the number of
actual listeners (Natale, 1990). Despite this difficulty, the efforts made by the BBC
to attract the interest of the Italians proved to be successful. The letters sent by lis-
teners of the Italian Service to Colonel Stevens, the most popular broadcaster in Italy,
contained expressions of gratitude for the work undertaken by the BBC’s team.
Stevens was seen as uno di famiglia [one of the family]. In more than one letter
the Colonel’s admirers wished he would visit them in Italy at the end of the war.
In other cases the writers requested an autographed picture of him (Lo Biundo,
2014: 51–58).
The success of Radio London’s broadcasts is further confirmed by the accounts of
people who survived the war. It is not rare to hear elderly people referring to Radio
London as the voice of freedom. These accounts on the favourable reception of the
British broadcasts do not enable us to draw reliable conclusions about the percen-
tage of listeners. However, they provide an insight into both the feelings and
emotions of many Italians in wartime and the role of the BBC in Fascist Italy.
While a positive portrait of Radio London has prevailed in the Italian heritage
of the Second World War for over seventy years, the ambiguity of the British propa-
ganda to Italy is clearly reflected in the radio broadcasts of the Italian Service.
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The double role of Allied Forces as both occupiers and liberators of Italy has been
extensively analysed by the Second World War historiography (Mercuri, 1973;
Ellwood, 1985; Piffer, 2010; Williams, 2013; Patti, 2013). In this article, this dual
nature is studied from the perspective of the BBC propaganda towards Italy in the
months preceding the Allied landing in Sicily and the Italian campaign (1942–45).
Two different but complementary aspects are at the centre of these investigations.
Initially, a selection of radio broadcasts will be analysed in order to discover how
the BBC contributed to the portrait of the Anglo-Americans as guarantors of both
freedom and better living conditions for the Italians.1 In the final section, the occu-
pation/liberation will be analysed from the angle of the relationships between British
authorities (the occupiers/liberators) and the Italian anti-Fascist employees at the
BBC (the ‘occupied’). Here the article will explore in greater depth the degree of
freedom of the BBC’s Italian broadcasters and their political role in the UK.
Self-portrait of the Allies: Civilian Safety and the Food Issue
The Allies’ victories in North Africa at the end of 1942 would be followed by the
Casablanca conference of January 1943. At the conference was established that
the Allies would continue to pursue a Mediterranean strategy by landing in Sicily
the following Summer. The Husky Operation, as the military operations in the
island were secretly named, started the 10 July 1943 and opened the Italian cam-
paign (Pack, 1977; Hinsley, 1993).
The new season of Anglo-American military successes would be supported by the
‘fourth front’ (Cruickshank, 1977; Mercuri, 1998; Lanotte, 2012) as well. In particu-
lar, the BBC Italian Service would begin the so-called ‘war of nerves’, as one directive of
the Political Warfare Executive (PWE) to the radio attests. The PWEwas established in
1940 to unify all the British institutions in charge of propaganda. This organization
sent weekly directives to the Italian Service. During the Allies’ occupation an important
role would be also played by the Psychological Warfare Branch, a joint
Anglo-American institution.2 The ‘war of nerves’ strategy consisted of repeating the
message that ‘the end of the Tunisian campaign would be followed by further blows
at the Axis’ underbelly without predicting where the blows would fall’ (NA FO, 18
March 1943). The aim, in accordance with the broader Allied objective of undermin-
ing civilian morale (Mercuri, 1983), was to create a feeling of uncertainty and danger.
In the same months the PWE concurrently repeated that the BBC should take a
friendly approach in order to appeal to Italians (NA FO, 14 January 1943). In
other words, the Allies needed to guarantee the collaboration of civilians, or at
1While this article focuses on the programmes broadcast in 1942–45, the actual political and economical reconstruction
of the country in the same years will be neglected, since this topic would deserve a separate treatment. Publications on the
theme include Ellwood (1985), Piffer (2010), Williams (2013), and Patti (2013).
2On the history of PWE see Lockhart (1947) and Garnett (2002). When the Allied landed in Italy an important role
would be also played by the Anglo-American Psychological Warfare Branch. On the role of the PWB in Italy see
Footitt and Tobia (2013: 69–91).
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least the non-obstruction of their military operations. It was crucial to stress that the
British were not fighting against Italy as a country; they were instead combatting the
dictatorship of Mussolini. The Italians and the Fascist regime, as the radio reiterated
until the Allies’ landing in Sicily, had to be considered as two separate entities. Fur-
thermore, if the Italians rejected the Fascist regime, they would not receive poor
treatment at the hand of the occupying troops.
The second step was to convince the population that the British could improve
their living conditions by taking care of their safety and provide food supplies.
Regardless of their Italian origins, civilians would be treated as if they were
British citizens. In this regard, the bombings of Italian cities as well as the food
issue were the object of discussions in many programmes that were broadcast
around the time of the El Alamein victory and the Allies’ landing in Sicily. The
responsibility for the deaths of many civilians killed by bombs was usually attributed
to Mussolini’s regime for not planning any security measures to protect the Italian
population
In just one raid on Genoa, more people were killed, in proportion to the popu-
lation of the town, than in two years of bombing of Great Britain. It happened
in a single shelter, in the course of one brief hour, and the casualties were not
caused by the British bombs, but by the Fascist misgovernment- as irresponsible
as it is inefficient. (BBC WAC IS, 19 November 1942).3
The bombings of Genoa mentioned in the programmes had taken place in June
1940, only a few days after the Italian declaration of war.4
Programmes describing the situation in the UK were also very frequent. Their aim
was to point out the extreme differences between the Fascist mismanagement and
the care of the British government for its civilians. British authorities, as these pro-
grammes often repeated, would supply their citizens with air-raid shelters and gas
masks and would evacuate the children prior to the outbreak of the war
Do you want to know how England went into the war? First of all, by distribut-
ing 46 million gas masks. Second, by ordering the evacuation of all children and
all administrative institutions. Then in every square and in every park they built
underground air raid shelters for those left behind, and shelters made out of
reinforced concrete in every street. Then England went on to organise its air
defence; and finally it built enough fighter planes to make the Luftwaffe’s air
raids more and more difficult and dangerous. Then, and only then, did
England build its big bombers and all the other weapons which now dominate
the skies and the battlefields. (BBC WAC IS, 24 November 1942)
3With a few exceptions, for which I found the original text in English, the English translations of the Italian Service radio
transcripts are mine. In this case the text in English is original.
4On the bombings of Italy and France during the Second World War see Baldoli and Knapp (2012).
VOICES OF OCCUPIERS/LIBERATORS 63
The evident proof of the effectiveness of such advanced defensive measures,
suggested another programme in November 1942, was the stoic attitude of the
British civilians towards the unforeseen tragic circumstances brought about by the
war. The programme describes the typical day of Mr Smith, the protagonist,
during war time. After hearing the air-raid siren, Mr Smith goes to his allocated
air shelter as usual, but unfortunately the conclusion of that particular day is not
so ordinary because his house is destroyed by a bomb. In spite of this disastrous
event the self-control of the British man is worthy of admiration
His house, furniture, personal belongings, twenty years’ worth of honest and
honourable work all gone up in smoke. What was he to do? Despair? Cry? Cer-
tainly not! Mr Smith, at a brisk pace, went to the Citizens’ Advice Bureau.
There were about 20 people queuing, all homeless like him, all victims of the
bombs like him, no clothes, no money. In less than half an hour the queue dis-
appeared. Mr Smith received 20 pounds for instant aid […]. He received a
voucher for a suit, an overcoat, linen and shoes, which were delivered to him
a few hours later. And, most importantly, he received a paper upon which it
was stated that ‘Mr Smith is allowed to occupy a real flat on a real street
immediately (BBC WAC IS, 1 December 1942).
Before July 1943 the food question was another highly debated issue in the Italian
Service programmes. In this case too, comparisons between Italy and Great Britain
were made to reinforce the image of the British administration as both reliable and
responsible. The food situation in Great Britain, as BBC broadcasters often said, was
proof of the substantial efforts the British government wouldmake to satisfy the essen-
tial needs of its population. Nevertheless, Fascist propaganda was trying to discredit
the British government by misinforming Italians on the distribution of food in the UK.
Why is Fascist propaganda trying to show that the food situation in England is
disastrous? An article, which will be read to you shortly, claims this. Why does
it? For many reasons: first of all, for the oldest and proverbial principle that
‘trouble shared is a trouble halved’. It is a theme that let [the Fascist regime]
hope that the English are as tired of the war as the Italians. An attempt to
show that there is a shortage of food in England is the same as saying that
the marine campaign is going gloriously well.’ (BBC WAC IS, 5 May 1943).
At the end of the programme, an extract from an article published by the Italian
newspaper Il Messaggero on the ‘precarious British food situation’ is quoted.
The practice of reading quotes from Italian press or speeches of Fascist politicians
was very common at the BBC. In 1939, the BBCMonitoring Service had been estab-
lished with the aim of monitoring and transcribing the content of foreign press and
radios. All these collected materials would be then used for propaganda purposes,
together with information obtained through other sources such as British informants
in Italian territories and Italian prisoners in the UK.
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In particular, the Italian prisoners of war were often mentioned in the BBC pro-
grammes as witnesses of the dignified treatment they were receiving in the British
POW camps. Broadcasts about the food supplies provided the perfect pretext to
introduce the theme of the prisoners’ diet.
I do not want to mention everything they found, since to boast about a sump-
tuously decked table is as unpleasant as it is rude, but they found that bread was
not rationed, that there were plenty of potatoes and vegetables, and that pasta
was not rationed. They found that in the restaurants people can order all the
food they want without coupons. Meat was on the menu everyday. […] But
what about the Italians? (BBC WAC IS, 1 May 1943).
Whilst the texts examined so far extol the responsible and careful British admin-
istration in July 1943 Radio London alluded explicitly to the better life conditions,
which the Allies promised to bring. A programme dated 17 July 1943 tells the
account of a French woman about the Allies’ arrival in Tunis
Days ago, I happened to hear a French woman on the radio who said that, when
the Allied troops arrived in Tunis, they brought large quantities of canned milk
for the children. The same happened some months before in Tripoli, where con-
densed and powdered milk was distributed to Italian and Arab children after
the occupation. If you want to find an explanation for this kindness of heart,
you will only have to observe what England does for its children and particu-
larly for their nutrition. (BBC WAC IS, 17 July 1943)
After a detailed description of the food rations for children in the UK, the broad-
caster concluded that what happened in Tunis occurred in Sicily as well. The Allied
troops would provide food and health for all children. Italian mothers – that was the
implied message – could rest assured that their children would receive good care.
Self-portrait of the Allies: Italian Cultural Heritage and
Reconstruction
After the Allies’ landing in Sicily, it certainly became easier for the BBC to talk about
the Anglo-American successes. Many programmes dated July 1943, refer to the joy
of North-Africans and Sicilians and to the warm welcome received in the conquered
territories. What became more difficult was handling topics such as the safety and
wellbeing of the population, since the Italian campaign proved to be more difficult
and slow than initially expected. While the Allies were now liberating Italy as prom-
ised, ‘the new invaders soon discovered that between the abstract […] and the phys-
ical realities of Southern Italy in late 1943, there lay a world and more of difference’
(Ellwood, 1985: 49).
The Allied Military Government of Occupied Territories was now the
Anglo-American institution in charge of administering the conquered territories.
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As such, it was central to emphasize what the Control Commission was doing to
support the reconstruction of Italy. The Italian Service started claiming that the
Allies were doing their best to distribute food provisions. However, the war was dif-
ficult and there were many obstacles to overcome before Italy could remedy its
shortage of supplies (Ellwood, 1985; Williams, 2013). The importation and distri-
bution of food were mainly obstructed by military operations and the German
attacks on the main communication routes (BBC WAC IS, 25 August 1944). Also,
it would take some time before Italian factories could access all the raw materials,
machinery, transportation, power, and fuel needed to start working properly
again. Nevertheless, as claimed by Colonel Stevens in November 1944, the Allied
Forces were gradually rehabilitating the Italian industries, as the increased pro-
duction of essential goods in liberated Italy showed (BBC WAC IS, 20 November
1944).
It may not be a coincidence that the number of broadcasts mentioning bombings
decreased in 1944–45. Information about bombings would still be aired, but it
received less prominence in BBC coverage. Whenever bombs were the theme of pro-
grammes, the approach adopted by the BBC was moderate; references to human
victims in Italy were almost absent. When discussing the damage caused by the
air raids, Radio London began by mentioning all the measures taken by the Allies
to protect and restore historical monuments instead, as several programmes show
The war has its toll, but, as far as possible the Allied forces are aware of the
importance of artwork and historical buildings. With regard to European civi-
lisation, they are trying to spare everyone from the horrors of war, or at least to
limit the damage. This was declared yesterday in the House of Commons by the
Minister ofWar Sir James Grigg, who also provided detailed information on the
measures taken by the Allies to safeguard the artistic heritage in the operational
zones. (BBC WAC IS, 1 January 1944)
Under the supervision of expert archaeologists, the text continues, special div-
isions were already working in the liberated territories, restoring the most
damaged buildings and protecting items of cultural value, which had been passed
down through thirty centuries of history.5
A month later, Radio London said that the British authorities had started to col-
laborate with the Sovrintendenza alle Belle Arti Italiana to rescue numerous monu-
ments from certain destruction (BBC WA IS, 7 February 1944). The theme of
cultural preservation arose several other times in the BBC’s Italian programmes
during 1944, especially in those cases where the Allies were operating close to
cities of great historical and artistic interest. The day before the liberation of
Rome, just to provide one example, the Italian Service transmitted the declaration
of General Maitland Wilson, the Supreme Allied Commander in the Mediterranean
theatre, on the cultural prominence of the city
5On the defence of artworks in Italy see Baldoli et al. (2011: 101–20).
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Allied authorities know very well that ROME is the Pope’s residence and that
the City includes the neutral State of VATICAN City. It is, therefore, the firm
intention of the Allies and their military authorities to take all measures possible
to safeguard the population of Rome as well as the historical and religious
monuments in the city. (BBC WA IS, 3 June 1944)
But the role of the Allied forces, as stated in another programme, also included
helping the country to reconstruct its political life. The Anglo-Americans were col-
laborating with local authorities, since they aimed to see an independent and free
Italy as soon as possible. However, Radio London claimed, there was still a substan-
tial obstacle to Italian democracy: German forces. The programme once again
opened with premise of the ‘hard and difficult war’. Only by destroying Nazism
could the Allies finally rebuild ‘a world where the governors keep the governors
in check, a world where authority, work and money are shared as equally as poss-
ible’ (BBC WAC IS, 4 April 1944).
Behind the Microphones: the British Foreign Office and the Italian
exiles
As we have seen thus far, before the Anglo-American landing in Sicily and during the
actual occupation, BBC programmes described the Allied occupiers as liberators and
guarantors of better living conditions. British propaganda was trying to persuade the
Italians that the military actions against their country were a necessary evil in the
interests of victory. Moreover, all political and administrative choices were made
for the sake of civilians and a democratic future.
Nevertheless, if we concentrate on the political relationships between the British
Foreign Office and the Italian broadcasters, it is evident that neither the destiny of
Italy, nor the anti-Fascist cause, was a British priority. Certain political questions
were more delicate than others and caused misgivings and concern among the
Italian exiles. This was the case of the Italian unconditional surrender.6
The programmes broadcast before 8 September, the day of Italy’s surrender do not
present any form of dissent against the idea of an Italian unconditional surrender (Lo
Biundo, 2014: 116–29). However, some documents of the Foreign Office reveal that
the issue was in fact heavily debated.
In August 1943, Colonel Stevens wrote to Bruce Lockhart, head of the PWE, to
inform him about a conversation he had had with some Italian collaborators
It came as a great surprise to me a few days ago when I discovered through a
chance conversation with an Italian colleague, his reaction to the recent devel-
opments. I have since discussed the question with several other Italians who
have not much in common except their anti-Fascism and a distinctly
pro-English attitude. On one essential I find general agreement: it is roughly
6On the unconditional surrender of Italy see Rossi (1993); Di Nolfo & Serra (2010).
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this: ‘British propaganda has for years differentiated between Fascists and
Italian people. It has conveyed to the Italians, especially during the last few
months, the message that if they got rid of Fascism they would receive a differ-
ent treatment. The Italians now find that, though they have got rid of Fascism,
so far from being treated differently they are faced, as uncompromisingly as
ever, with unconditional surrender. This they feel is a fraudulent trick, which
is only aggravated by speaking in the same breath of honourable peace and
unconditional surrender’ (NA FO, 7 August, 1943).
In a letter to a third person whose name is not specified, Lockhart wrote that the
Colonel’s request that he should deal with the issue should be ignored, given his well-
known pro-Italian attitude (NA FO, 9 August 1943).
The circumstances experienced by some Italian exiles working for Radio London
further confirm the complexity of their relationships with the Foreign Office. When
Italy entered the war many Italians living in the UK were interned as enemy aliens.
Several anti-Fascists were interned in the British Prisoner of War Camps too, despite
their well-known political opposition to the regime (Bernabei, 1997; Sponza, 2000).
Among these internees there were some of the anti-Fascists who were already
working for the BBC. These included Limentani, and Treves. Witnesses of their
period of internment revealed that there was no difference in terms of the treatment
received by refugees who were in the UK because of their political opposition to the
regime, and Fascist prisoners.
After surviving the sinking of the Arandora Star, in June 1940, Limentani sent a
report on the episode to the Foreign Office. The Arandora Star had been hit by a
torpedo at beginning of July 1940, while transporting internees and PoWs to
Canada. Around 446 victims lost their lives (Bernabei, 1997: 178–190; Sponza,
2000: 105–112). In the introduction to this document he mentions his internment.
He was interned on 13th June and in his camp ‘no distinction whatsoever was
made either at that time or after between refugees and other people’ (NA FO n.d.
a, b, most likely July-August 1940).7 Later in the same report, Limentani denounced
the inhumane conditions in which the prisoners were forced to live by referring to
very inadequate hygiene facilities and food shortages. He also referred to his job
at BBC:
As I thought there was the possibility that I should be parted from the group of
Italian refugees with which I was staying, I informed on the same evening the
Commandant Braybrook of the camp and some other officers about my pos-
ition as a refugee and as an official of the BBC, and I asked them not to split
the group of refugees. I was told that, if I was a refugee, my position was cer-
tainly being considered. I was therefore very surprised, on the following
morning, when I heard that my name was included in the list of those who
7The document is mentioned in Sponza (2002: 109)
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were going to leave, and that I had to part from all other refugees. (NA FO n.d.
a, b, most likely July–August 1940).
Evidently, in the eye of the British authorities, Limentani’s contribution to the
radio propaganda against the Fascist regime did not constitute a good enough
reason to allow him better treatment.
In an article published anonymously in the 9th August 1940 issue of the weekly
magazine The Tribune (FFT, FPT, 9 August 1940), Treves expressed very similar
opinions on his experience as an internee.8 The article starts with his account of
what happened on the morning ‘two gentlemen’ knocked on his door. ‘Suddenly
flashes of old remembrances’ of his past life in Italy, wrote Treves, came back to
him. Treves moved to England in 1938, after being arrested twice in Italy. Only
now this was happening in England and this time he was destined to internment as
an enemy alien. In Treves’ article there are also references to the ‘filthy and unhealthy’
environment and to the poor hygiene of the camps in which he had been interned for
over a month. A detail about his transfer to another camp is particularly interesting. If
he had been arrested only an hour before, he could have boarded theArandora Star, as
time of the arrest was the criterion that determined who was sent to the ship. The
sources on Treves’ internment are contradictory. Ruggero Orlando, interviewed by
Maura Piccialuti Caprioli (1979: V–XIII), declared that Paolo and Treves had not
been interned at all during the war. However, some documents of the Foreign
Office on the internments of Italian anti-Fascists (NA FO Statement by Mr Gillies),
as well as Treves’ article analysed in this essay, prove the contrary.
Another analogy between Limentani’s report and Treves’ article relates to the pol-
itical refugees status – both wrote that protection from the Fascist prisoners was not
guaranteed in the camps.
We discovered that there were some 70 anti-Fascist refugees in that camp. We
tried to keep together to avoid incidents and threats from the Fascists. Fascist
songs, threats and anti-British talk were the normal amusement of an over-
whelming majority of the internees. I tried to point this out and to explain
our intolerable position to the officers in charge, but the only reply was: ‘We
don’t care a damn about politics. Here everyone is the same’ (FFT, FPT,
9 August 1940).
Referring to another camp, Treves commented on the difficult moments he had
been through, declaring that he felt as if he was back in Italy, the country he had
escaped from.
The internment of Treves, Limentani and other Italian anti-Fascist exiles took
place when Italy entered the war. However, even in 1944, when the Italian broadcas-
ters were free citizens who had been working for the BBC for years, the Foreign
8The article was found among Treves’ personal papers in a box containing a copy of his publications. This is the reason
why he is most likely to be the author (FFT, FPT, box 4, Scritti).
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Office still had an influence on their lives. At the end of 1943, after the defeat of
Mussolini’s dictatorship and the Allied landing in Italy, some Italian broadcasters,
including Treves, Calosso, and Petrone, wrote to the Foreign Office authorities.
They expressed their desire to return to their country, where they felt they were
needed for the cause of liberation and political reconstruction. The British Foreign
Office initially refused them permission to leave England. It took many months
before they were able to reach Italy.
What connects these letters is the disappointment and inability to understand why
an answer from the Foreign Office was taking so long to arrive. Churchill and Eden
had promised that ‘the British government would then facilitate the repatriation of
all Italians of prominence’ (NA FO, 30 November 1943). Moreover, ‘after the
Moscow conference, the Allied authorities in Italy declared that they were looking
for anti-Fascists to help in the reconstruction of the country’ (NA FO Letter by
Umberto Calosso, n.d a, b). Calosso is here referring to the Conference of
Moscow of October–November 1943, between the foreign ministers of the UK,
the USA, the Republic of China, and the Soviet Union. Identifying anti-Fascists to
repatriate should not be that difficult, Calosso argued, since there were very few
Italian political refugees in England who met the Allies’ requirements (NA FO
letter by Umberto Calosso n.d a, b).
One possible explanation for the British authorities’ reticence is found in Philip
Noel Baker’ answer to a letter from Treves. In the letter Baker, who was the Ministry
ofWar Transport at the time, reported an extract of a message from the Foreign Office
We have consulted the British Broadcasting Corporation, who have strongly
expressed that there is little to gain in facilitating the return of Paolo Treves
to Italy at present. The same goes for his brother, mother and fiancée. On the
contrary, we would lose two capable and almost irreplaceable members of
the British Broadcasting Corporation’s Italian team. The British Broadcasting
Corporation are strongly of the opinion that the Treves brothers are certainly
of better use to the war effort in England than they are likely to ever be in
Italy. (IISH PTP, 21 April 1944)
The comments made by the Foreign Office on the Treves brothers are certainly
flattering. Yet, despite the praiseworthy and useful work undertaken for the
British propaganda, the two exiles were not free to follow their will and continue
their anti-Fascist activity in Italy. Treves obtained the authorization to return
home only at the end of 1944, more than a year after his first request to the
Foreign Office.
Conclusion
When the war ended, Treves (1945) and Limentani (1973) wrote about their experi-
ence at the BBC. Their texts show that they were extremely proud to work at Radio
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London for the anti-Fascist cause, and to serve their country from abroad. Some of
the broadcasters would write that in the majority of cases they felt free to express
their own opinions from the BBC’s microphones and to give proper information
rather than propaganda. However, the documents analysed show that, during the
years of the war, the relationships between the BBC’s Italian broadcasters and the
British authorities were not always easy. The case of the unconditional surrender
of Italy clearly demonstrates that there were moments in which the Italian exiles con-
tested the content of the programmes. The obvious incongruity between what the
anti-Fascist exiles declared at the end of the war and what the documents of
the Foreign Office disclose, show British radio’s difficult role as both the voice of
the occupier and of moral support for the Italian population. The Italian Service
was both a radio praised and thanked in the listeners’ letters and the instrument
used by the Foreign Office to address an enemy.
A more systematic analysis of the PWE and PWB directives as well as a more com-
prehensive examination of the Allies’ occupation of Italy might provide further evi-
dence of this contrast. Yet a simple comparison between the programmes and what
happened behind the BBC microphones, already reveals many contradictions in the
Radio London phenomenon. While the radio was reassuring the Italians that the
Allies would start a new season of democracy for Italy, the head of the PWE declared
that Colonel Stevens’ attempts to address the Italian employees’ concerns about the
future of their country had to be ignored. Despite the Italian Service constantly
repeating that food rations in England were decent for both British citizens and
Italian war prisoners, Limentani and Treves exposed the inhumane conditions of
their internment, as well as the absence of protection from Fascist prisoners.
Lastly, while the BBC was transmitting programmes on the political and economic
reconstruction of Italy, the Italian broadcasters at the BBC were not allowed to
return to Italy, which they had been forced to leave by the Fascist regime.
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